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IntroduCtIon
The history of the sociopolitical conflict surrounding the U.S.–
Mexico border and the concomitant status of Latinas/os/xs in the 
United States predates formalized immigration law.1  The federalization 
1 Scholars and advocates debate the terminology used to describe the incredibly diverse 
group known broadly as Latinas/os/x.  The gendered use of “Latino” has also provoked a 
broader use of Latino/a; Latina/o; and Latinx, the last term more contemporarily used to in-
clude gendered and nonbinary people.  Stephen Nuño-Pérez & Gwen Aviles, Is ‘Latinx’ Elit-
ist?  Some Push Back at the Word’s Growing Use, NBC News (Mar. 7, 2019 8:31 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latinx-elitist-some-push-back-word-s-growing-use-n957036; 
see generally Haley Patterson, A Sociolinguistic Survey of “Latinx” (2017) (honors thesis) 
© 2020 Mariela Olivares. All rights reserved.
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of immigration law began at the end of the nineteenth century, setting the 
cornerstone for current law and changing the legal status of the people 
living in the region.  As a result, native Latina/o/x people were forcibly 
deterred and had to seek admission into the United States through an 
increasingly complex system of immigration  law.  But the imposition 
of formal restrictions could not stop the migration of people from Mex-
ico and Central American countries, including Guatemala, Honduras, 
and El Salvador—the four countries from which the highest number of 
immigrants in the United States originate.  These four countries serve 
as the focus of this discussion on the effects and role of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) on Latina/o/x migration trends 
since its passage.
In this Article, I discuss the effects of IRCA on Latina/o/x migration 
through a historical and critical legal studies lens.  First, I discuss the 
history of immigration law and policy and the important and undeniable 
intersections between immigration law and formal and informal racial 
and ethnic discrimination.  I provide a brief review of the history prior to 
the enactment of IRCA to understand the political context of its passage 
and of its effects.  The Article then explores the passage of IRCA and its 
immediate effects on the legalization of millions of previously undocu-
mented immigrants, while also noting the gendered implications of the 
legalization program.  In fact, IRCA helped set the stage for continued 
gendered discrimination against women migrants by favoring the tradi-
tional male workforce in agricultural industries.  Moreover, despite its 
antithetical purpose, the legalization program resulted in increased rates 
of undocumented migration from Central America.
Next, the Article contextualizes this historical perspective to  more 
contemporary times by noting how IRCA-era migration trends are 
reflected in recent Central American migration patterns and in current 
(on file with the Nighthawks Open Institutional Repository, University of North Georgia, 
https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.
com/&httpsredir=1&article=1014&context=honors_theses) (“Latin Americans who do not 
subscribe to the gender binary system have trouble expressing their heritage because of being 
forced to self-identify as either Latino or Latina, while Latinx alleviates that tension.”).  The 
term Latinx has its critics, however: “a large portion of the Spanish-speaking community feels 
that the new label misrepresents them.  Those who argue against the term have often cited 
that it ‘excludes more people than it includes,’ and thus is counterintuitive if the goal truly is 
inclusivity.”  Id.  In this Article, I use the all-inclusive Latina/o/x, because, although it is perhaps 
cumbersome for the reader, it most accurately describes the breadth of people while allowing 
for accuracy and precision in both the Spanish and English translations.
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political movements to bring legal relief to certain undocumented groups. 
Such efforts include the advocacy for the Deferred Action for Child-
hood Arrivals (DACA) program and the now-failed Deferred Action for 
Parental Accountability (DAPA) program.  More recently, these IRCA-
era migration trends have influenced increased numbers of families and 
children to take the risk of migrating to the United States.  The Article 
concludes by commenting on the continuation of these entrenched his-
torical trends.
I. hIstory of ImmIgrAtIon lAw And PolICy
In discussing Latina/o/x immigrant migration, it is important to rec-
ognize that racial and ethnic systemic discrimination has been intrinsic 
to U.S. immigration law and policy since its inception.  This system in 
many ways set the stage for IRCA.2  Federal immigration law developed 
in part as a reaction to Chinese immigration, with the intent to stop the 
flow of Chinese people into the United States.  In the 1889 case of Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld congressio-
nal plenary power to restrict the immigration of Chinese immigrants 
to the United States, noting that Chinese immigration brought “conse-
quent irritation, proportionately deep and bitter, [which] was followed, 
in many cases, by open conflicts, to the great disturbance of the public 
peace.”3  Concluding that Chinese laborers had a “baneful effect” on the 
country, the Court upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act, which prohibited 
certain immigration of Chinese nationals to the United States.4
The United States’ explicit targeting of immigrants of color contin-
ued throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries.  While 
restricting or forbidding Asian, Latina/o/x, and African immigrants and 
other members of the “Black race,” it welcomed white immigrants from 
western and northern Europe.5  In fact, the Immigration Act of 1924 
2 I have written extensively about the discriminatory history of immigration law along 
racial and ethnic lines.  See, e.g., Mariela Olivares, Battered by Law: The Political Subordination 
of Immigrant Women, 64 Am. L. Rev. 23, 264–701 (2014); Mariela Olivares, Intersectionality at 
the Intersection of Profiteering & Immigration Detention, 94 Neb. L. Rev. 963, 1006–13 (2016); 
Mariela Olivares, Narrative Reform Dilemmas, 82 Mo. L. Rev. 1089 (2018).  This Part uses and 
builds upon my previous work.
3 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889).
4 Id.
5 See Ian Haney López, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race 27 (NYU 
Press, 2nd ed. 2006) (noting the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, the creation of 
the “Asiatic barred zone” in 1917, a Senate bill excluding “all members of the African or black 
68
Chicanx-Latinx Law Review [37:65
restricted migration so that new migrants did not constitute more than 
2 percent of the number of noncitizens from that country who were rep-
resented in the 1890 U.S. census.6  This national origins quota intended 
to “confine immigration as much as possible to western and northern 
European stock” and disfavor immigrants of color.7
Through much of the twentieth century, U.S. immigration law 
and policy continued to favor white immigrants, who, it was believed, 
would more easily assimilate into a dominant white American culture.8 
These efforts manifested in various ways, including policies aiming to 
slow the rate of migration and expel Latina/o/x immigrants—especially 
Mexicans.9  Perhaps one of the most notorious plans was the Bracero 
program, which operated from 1924 until its formal end in 1964.  The 
program brought Mexican laborers from rural parts of Mexico to the 
United States to work agricultural and other manual labor jobs.10  The 
Mexican temporary workers received no form of permanent lawful sta-
tus and ultimately were deported during the program and at its end.11 
Many of those deported were U.S citizens of Mexican ancestry.12
race,” and a quota system designed to limit immigration to western and northern Europeans); 
Hiroshi Motomura, Who Belongs?  Immigration Outside the Law and the Idea of Americans in 
Waiting, 2 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 359, 368 (2012); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, 
and Domestic Race Relations: A ‘Magic Mirror’ into the Heart of Darkness, 73 Ind. L.J. 1111, 
1120, 1127–30 (1998) [hereinafter “Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Rela-
tions”].
6 Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations, supra note 5 at 1127–28.
7 López, supra note 5, at 27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 Motomura, supra note 5, at 369–71; Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race 
Relations, supra note 5 at 1129–30; López, supra note 5 at 27.
9 Immigrants from Mexico have long constituted the largest group of Latina/o/x immi-
grants in the United States, comprising 25 percent of all immigrants in 2017—far above El 
Salvador, the nation with the second largest total group of Latina/o/x immigrants in the United 
States at 3 percent.  Jynnah Radford, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, Pew Research 
Center (June 17, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/key-findings-about-
u-s-immigrants.
10 Motomura, supra note 5, at 370; S. Poverty Law Ctr., Close to Slavery: Guestworker Pro-
grams in the United States, (Feb. 19, 2013) https://www.splcenter.org/20130218/close- slavery-
guestworker-programs-united-states.
11 Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra note 2, at 1008–09; López, supra note 
5, at 27 (citing U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, “The Tarnished Golden Door: Civil Rights 
Issues in Immigration” 10 (1980)); see also Kevin R. Johnson, The Forgotten “Repatriation” 
of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and Lessons for the “War on Terror,” 26 Pace L. Rev. 1, 2, 4 
(2005) [hereinafter The Forgotten ‘Repatriation’]; Yolanda Vázquez, Constructing Crimmigra-
tion: Latino Subordination in a “Post-Racial” World, 76 Ohio St. L.J. 600, 621–22 (2015).
12 Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations, supra note 5, at 27; The For-
gotten “Repatriation,” supra note 11, at 4.
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Immigration law and policy continued to target Latina/o/x immi-
grants in the twentieth century through indirect tactics.  Although the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA) repealed the national 
origin quota system and utilized race-neutral language, it also created a 
new limit on migration from the Western Hemisphere to only 120,000 
individuals per year.  This provision was “part of a compromise [for] 
those who feared a drastic upswing in Latin American immigration.”13 
Moreover, the INA and its 1976 Amendments imposed an annual 
immigration limit of 20,000 people per country,14 a ceiling that drasti-
cally slowed migration of immigrants of color from certain “developing” 
countries, affecting Mexicans especially.15
In response, then-President Gerald Ford predicted ill effects on 
Mexican migration, noting: “I am concerned . . . about one aspect of the 
legislation which has the effect of reducing the legal immigration into 
this country from Mexico.  Currently about 40,000 natives of Mexico 
legally immigrate to the United States each year.  This legislation would 
cut the number in half.”16  Although Ford vowed that he would advo-
cate for reform to increase the number of immigrant visas for  Mexican 
nationals, he was unsuccessful in getting any legislation through Con-
gress during his presidency.17
13 Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations, supra note 5, at 1132; see also 
Vázquez, supra note 11, at 631; Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra note 2, at 
1010; Pub. L. No. 89–236, 79 Stat. 921 (repealed 1976).
14 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–236, sec. 2, 79 Stat. 911, 911–
12 (codified as amended at INA § 202(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1986)); Race, the Immigration 
Laws, and Domestic Race Relations, supra note 5 at 1333.  The 1990 Immigration Act altered 
this quota and instituted a worldwide ceiling of 675,000 immigrants, while also changing the 
per- country limitations.  See Michael J. Greenwood & Fred A. Ziel, “The Impact of the Im-
migration Act of 1990 on U.S. Immigration,” U.C. Davis, http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/cir/
greenwood/combined.htm.  The INA amendments of 1976 repealed the Western Hemisphere 
restrictions.  INA Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–571, sec. 2, 90 Stat. 2703, 2703 (codified 
as amended at INA § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)).
15 Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations, supra note 5, at 1333 (noting 
the targeted effect on immigrants from “developing nations” like Mexico, the Philippines, and 
India).  See also Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra note 2, at 1010; Vázquez, 
supra note 11, at 631 nn.195–96 (citing Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens 
and the Making of Modern America, 261 (2004)).
16 Presidential Statement on Signing the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments 
of 1976, American Presidency Project (Oct. 21, 1976), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/docu-
ments/statement-signing-the-immigration-and-nationality-act-amendments-1976.
17 Id.; see also Olivares, Narrative Reform Dilemmas, supra note 2, at 1102.
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In 1977, Jimmy Carter pushed legislation to (1) raise the ceiling for 
the amount of Mexican nationals who could migrate, and (2) establish 
a legalization program for undocumented immigrants already in the 
United States.  Though this effort was unsuccessful, it did result in the 
creation of the “Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy” 
to “study and evaluate the existing laws, policies and procedures gov-
erning the admission of immigrants and refugees.”18  Ronald Reagan, an 
ardent proponent of free markets who viewed undocumented migration 
as a result of unmet labor demands, assumed the presidency and consid-
ered the findings of the committee.  Ultimately, Reagan advocated for 
regularizing the immigration status of migrant workers:
It makes one wonder about the illegal alien fuss.  Are great 
numbers of our unemployed really victims of the illegal alien 
invasion or are those illegal tourists actually doing work our 
own people won’t do?  One thing is certain in this hungry 
world: No regulation or law should be allowed if it results in 
crops rotting in the fields for lack of harvesters.”19
Reagan’s call for more open agricultural labor markets led to the 
introduction of the IRCA bill, first introduced to Congress in 1982.  Con-
gress eventually passed IRCA in 1986 with heavy bipartisan support in 
both the House and the Senate.20  Reagan celebrated the new legislation 
and, at its signing, remarked: “Future generations of Americans will be 
thankful for our efforts.”21
II. ImmedIAte effeCts of IrCA
Despite Reagan’s recognition of the economic contributions of 
immigrants in the agricultural sector, IRCA did more than provide a 
path to legalization for some of the undocumented population.  IRCA 
also sought to deter undocumented immigration, particularly from Cen-
tral America.22  To achieve these goals, IRCA changed the law in two 
18 Evan Wyloge, The Immigration Reform and Control Act: What it Is, Why it Matters, 
Arizona State University (November 6, 1986), http://asu.news21.com/archive/2009/the_first_ 
immigration_amnesty.  See also Olivares, Narrative Reform Dilemmas, supra note 2, at 1102.
19 Wyloge, The Immigration Reform and Control Act; see also Olivares, Narrative Reform 
Dilemmas, supra note 2, at 1102–03.
20 Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99–603, § 101(a)(1), 
100 Stat. 3359, 3360–74 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012)).
21 Wyloge, The Immigration Reform and Control Act; see also Olivares, Narrative Reform 
Dilemmas, supra note 2, at 1103.
22   Dennise A. Calderon-Barrera, Hoffman v. NLRB: Leaving Undocumented Workers 
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ways, including: (1) creating strict prohibitions against employers hiring 
undocumented people; and (2) increasing antimigration enforcement 
measures at the United States border.23  These provisions, however, were 
not ultimately successful in deterring further migration, as discussed 
more below.  Most significantly for the purposes of this discussion, 
IRCA’s third principle aim was its legalization programs, which have 
had widespread and longterm effects on Latina/o/x immigration to the 
United States.
In recognition of the large number of undocumented workers 
already in the country who were, in Reagan’s words: “doing the jobs 
that Americans won’t do,” one of IRCA’s legalization programs provid-
ed benefits to undocumented agricultural workers.24  So-called “special 
agricultural workers” applying for the program had to prove that they 
resided in the United States for at least ninety days performing “seasonal 
agricultural services” between May 1985 and May 1986.25  Although not 
explicitly stated in the law, the provision aimed to keep this cheap labor 
force in agricultural work, to the benefit of those who profited from their 
labor.”26  Importantly, IRCA created a direct path towards lawful per-
manent residence by providing that some undocumented workers who 
could prove U.S. residency since January 1, 1982 may qualify for an eigh-
teenmonth-long lawful “temporary resident status.”27  This temporary 
resident status would then lead to “permanent resident status” if individ-
uals could demonstrate that they met the eligibility requirements.28
Unprotected Under United States Labor Laws? 6 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 119, 120 (2003); H.R. 
Rep. No. 99–682, pt. 1, at 56 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5660 (“[T]he [Judicia-
ry] Committee is convinced that as long as job opportunities are available to undocumented 
aliens, the intense pressure to surreptitiously enter this country or to violate status once admit-
ted as a nonimmigrant in order to obtain employment will continue.”).
23   8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2), (b)(1).
24   Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1160 (2012).
25 Id. § 1160(a)(1)(B); Hiroshi Motomura, What is ‘Comprehensive Immigration Reform’? 
Taking the Long View, 63 Ark. L. Rev. 225, 226 (2010) [hereinafter “Taking the Long View”]. 
See also Olivares, Unreformed: Towards Gender Equality in Immigration Law, 18 Chap. L. Rev. 
419, 427 (2015) [hereinafter Unreformed] (In this Article, I highlight IRCA as just one of the 
ways that immigration law subordinates women migrants.).
26   Taking the Long View, supra note 25, at 226 (discussing the political and commercial 
aims of the program).
27 8 USC § 1255(a); Taking the Long View, supra note 25, at 226.
28   8 USC § 1255(a); Taking the Long View, supra note 25, at 226 (discussing such require-
ments as being able to prove no felony convictions and English language proficiency).
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The legalization provisions of IRCA had astounding demograph-
ic effects on the Latina/o/x immigrant population in the United States. 
IRCA directly resulted in almost 3 million undocumented immigrants 
becoming lawful permanent residents (LPR), amounting to over 80 per-
cent of the estimated undocumented population achieving LPR status.29 
The majority of agricultural worker immigrants in the United States 
were Mexicans—likely a result of the Bracero guest worker program and 
Mexico’s geographic proximity.  Immigrants from other Central Amer-
ican countries also comprised a large percentage of the workers.  Thus, 
82 percent of those who became LPRs under the IRCA agricultural 
worker provision were Mexicans and Central Americans.30  Undeniably, 
then, the IRCA legalization program is an important component of the 
growing Latina/o/x presence in the United States.  Since the 1970s, the 
nation’s Latina/o/x population has grown six-fold.31  Current demograph-
ic estimates show that the U.S. Latina/o/x population reached a record 
59.9 million in 2018 compared to 47.8 million in 2008.32  By 2050, the 
Latina/o/x population is expected to reach 106 million people—double 
its current population.33
Despite bipartisan support, many criticized IRCA, especially the 
legalization program.  Critics asserted that beneficiaries were receiving 
29 Nancy Rytina, IRCA Legalization Effects: Lawful Permanent Residence and Natural-
ization Through 2001, Office of Policy & Planning Statistics Division, U.S. Immigration 
& Naturalization Service, 3, exhibit 1 (2002), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/
publications/irca0114int.pdf.; Hiroshi Motomura, Making Legal: The DREAM Act, Birthright 
Citizenship, and Broad-Scale Legalization, 16 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1127, 1137 (2012) [here-
inafter “Making Legal”]; Unreformed, supra note 25, at 427–28.  To break this down, 1,763,434 
obtained lawful status under the general legalization provision, and 1,277,041 obtained status 
as seasonal agricultural workers.  Rytina, supra, at 3, exh. 1.
30 María E. Enchautegui, A Comparison of Today’s Unauthorized Immigrants and the 
IRCA Legalized: Implications for Immigration Reform, 4 The Urban Institute (2013), avail-
able at http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412980-A-Compari-
son-of-Today-s-Unauthorized-Immigrants-and-the-IRCA-Legalized-Implications-for-Immi-
gration-Reform.PDF.
31 Héctor Tobar, How Latinos Are Shaping America’s Future, Nat’l Geographic July 2018, 
available at https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2018/07/latinos-hispanic-pow-
er-america-immigration-future.
32 Antonio Flores et al., U.S. Hispanic Population Reached New High in 2018, but 
Growth has Slowed, Pew Research Center (July 8, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2019/07/08/u-s-hispanic-population-reached-new-high-in-2018-but-growth-has-slowed.
33 Jens Manuel Krogstad, With Fewer New Fewer Arrivals, Census Lowers Hispanic Popu-
lation Projections, Pew Research Center (Dec. 16, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/12/16/with-fewer-new-arrivals-census-lowers-hispanic-population-projections-2.
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unfair prioritization towards legalization.34  Immigrant advocates also 
criticized the program, asserting that it created heightened vulnera-
bility of beneficiary family members, especially women.35  Indeed, as I 
and others have written, the IRCA special agricultural worker legal-
ization provision disproportionately benefited men, who were more 
often employed in agricultural industries.36  Working undocumented 
women were more heavily employed in domestic work, which had no 
IRCA legalization protections, as “[n]o equivalent provision was avail-
able .  .  . to nannies and housecleaners, or even to hotel workers and 
hospital aides, which are predominantly female positions.”37
This preference for agricultural work and the accompanying docu-
mentary provisions that favored regular work in agricultural industries 
meant that IRCA legalization was provided overwhelmingly to Cen-
tral American men, excluding women.38  This resulted in women and 
children remaining dependent on men’s migration and immigration sta-
bility—a longstanding phenomenon that continues to the present-day as 
shown by increased levels of migration by families and unaccompanied 
children.  Moreover, it should not be surprising that high levels of male 
migration would fuel continued migration of families coming to join 
fathers, husbands and partners.  Research shows that rather than wait-
ing for their family-based immigration petitions to be processed, family 
members simply joined IRCA beneficiaries in the United States, living 
and working unlawfully.39  Further, beneficiaries typically filed for fam-
ily-based immigration visas, creating a long backlog of visa applications 
that still exists today (though with less severe wait times).40
34 Making Legal, supra note 29, at 1138.
35 Id.
36  Unreformed, supra note 25, at 426–29; Margot Mendelson, The Legal Production of 
Identities: Narrative Analysis of Conversations with Battered Undocumented Women, 19 Berke-
ley Women’s Law J. 138, 205–06 (2004).
37 Mendelson, supra note 36, at 205.
38 Id. at 205–06; Unreformed, supra note 25, at 426–29; Laura E. Enriquez, Gendered Laws: 
VAWA, IRCA and the Future of Immigration Reform, HuffingtonPost.com, (Mar. 7, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-e-enriquez/domestic-violence-immigration_b_2793828.
html (last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
39 Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1446, 1454–55 
(2008).
40 Donald M. Kerwin, More than IRCA: U.S. Legalization Programs and the Current Poli-
cy Debate, Migration Policy Institute, 8 (Dec. 2010), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/
us-legalization-programs-by-the-numbers.
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In effect, IRCA’s lack of provisions for family members part-
ly provoked the increase in the undocumented population.  Thus, 
although demographic and migration data show that IRCA resulted 
in the legalization of about 3 million previously undocumented peo-
ple, the undocumented population in the United States rose through 
the 1990’s and 2000’s.  The number of undocumented Mexicans in the 
United States, for example, reached its highest in 2007 at approximately 
7,000,000—an increase of 4,000,000 since the IRCA legalization pro-
gram 20 years prior.41
In addition to IRCA’s lack of family-based protections, the 
surge in the undocumented population was due in part to the failure 
of subsequent immigration law reform required to address U.S. labor 
demands, such as reform in employment-based immigrant visa programs 
like employment-based lawful permanent residency and temporary 
worker provisions.42  Further, although IRCA partially addressed the 
unauthorized employment of undocumented workers, it did not provide 
implementing regulations to establish protocol for the identity verifi-
cation system and employment documentation provisions.  As a result, 
employers complained about confusing implementing guidelines, their 
obligations, and the range of purported penalties imposed for violations.43 
Thus, IRCA did little to deter immigrants seeking unlawful employment.
Finally, IRCA’s efforts to fortify the U.S.–Mexico border against 
continued or increased migration of undocumented immigrants result-
ed in exponential increases in United States governmental spending on 
border enforcement but did not stymie the rate of undocumented entry 
by immigrants.  Indeed, after IRCA, the rate of migration by undocu-
mented immigrants increased and actually led to more immigrants 
remaining longterm in the United States rather than returning to their 
home countries, in part so as to not risk the dangerous journey over 
41 Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows Are Down 
Sharply Since Mid-Decade, Pew Research Center, (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.pewhispanic.
org/2010/09/01/us-unauthorized-immigration-flows-are-down-sharply-since-mid-decade.
42 Id.; Wishnie, supra note 39, at 1454 (noting that “A significant shortcoming 
of . . . IRCA . . . was the absence of any meaningful provision to manage future migration.”); 
Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 So. Cal. Law Rev. 503, 528–29 (2007) 
(commenting that according to estimates in the early 2000s, undocumented immigrants make 
up nearly 5 percent of the U.S. labor force, and in sectors like restaurant cooks, construction 
and agricultural workers, the percentages are much higher).
43 Kerwin, supra note 40, at 8; Pamela D. Nichols, The United States Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986: A Critical Perspective, 8 NW J. of Int’l L. &. Bus 503, 514–15 (1987).
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the heavily-policed border.44  In short, the IRCA programs provided 
important legalization and work authorization for millions of undocu-
mented workers, the majority of who were Latinos (men), but also put 
into motion decades of increased immigration from Latin America.
III. IrCA effeCts on Current mIgrAtIon trends And PolItICAl 
movements
Indeed, current migration trends of Latinas/os/x and recent efforts 
at both legalization programs and immigration deterrence programs 
illustrate the continuing effects of IRCA.  According to a U.S. Census 
Bureau survey, by 2017, there were more than 44.4 million immigrants in 
the United States, representing approximately 13.6 percent of the total 
U.S. population.45  By comparison, and to illustrate upward trends of 
migration post-IRCA, in 1970, immigrants represented approximately 
4.7 percent of the U.S. population; 6.2 percent in 1980; 7.9 percent in 1990; 
and 11.1 percent in 2000.46  Moreover, Mexican and Central American 
immigrants continue to represent a large portion of the immigrant pop-
ulation.  In 2017, Mexicans remained the largest group of immigrants in 
the United States, making up approximately 25 percent of the total num-
ber of immigrants.47  Demographic data from 2015 further indicates that 
71 percent of undocumented immigrants hail from Mexico, Guatemala, 
Honduras and El Salvador, with Mexicans accounting for a majority of 
that percentage, too.48  Still, the number of Mexican undocumented immi-
grants in the United States from 2007–2017 represented a much smaller 
share than the total number of undocumented immigrants in the past.49
Prognostication of future trends in immigration also point to sus-
tained numbers of Latina/o/x migrants arriving and remaining in the 
44 Walter A. Ewing, From Denial to Acceptance: Effectively Regulating Immigration to the 
United States, 16 Stan. L & Pol. Rev. 445, 454–55 (2004) (noting that the policy aimed at de-
terring future migration of immigrants by fortifying popular border crossing points resulted 
instead in immigrants crossing at other points of entry; immigrants more frequently using the 
services of smugglers to get them across the border; and more immigrants choosing to stay in 
the United States rather than risk leaving and having to make the dangerous journey again).
45 Radford, supra note 9.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Marc R. Rosenblum & Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, An Analysis of Unauthorized Immigrants in 
the United States by Country and Region of Birth, Migration Pol’y Inst. (2015).
49 Passel, supra note 41 (finding that “the decrease in the Mexican born [immigrants] was 
the major factor driving down the overall population of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S., 
which in 2017 was 1.7 million below its peak of 12.2 million in 2007.”).
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United States, with numbers suggesting that, in 2065, 31 percent of the 
foreign-born population in the United States will be “Hispanic,” and 
18 percent of the total population will be the children of foreign-born 
immigrants.50  One estimate indicates that the percentage of unautho-
rized immigrant adults who have lived in the United States for at least 
a decade has gone from 44 percent of the undocumented population in 
2000 to 63 percent in 2010.51  And only 15 percent of the undocumented 
population in 2010 had lived in the United States for less than 5 years, 
compared with 32 percent in 2000.52
These continued rates of migration, and in particular permanent 
immigration, are due in part to IRCA’s failures to expand legalization 
eligibility to other immigrants, including to the families of workers who 
were able to legalize their status.  Thus, many currently undocumented 
immigrants likely joined beneficiaries of IRCA’s legalization programs 
either at the time of IRCA or in subsequent waves.  Further, IRCA’s 
effects include the high rates of children living in the United States 
(defined as under eighteen years old) born to a foreign-born parent 
or born abroad but living with a foreign-born parent.  Data indicates 
that, in 2014, 25 percent of all children (or 17.5 million children) in the 
United States fell into one of those categories.53  In 2000, 30 percent of 
the undocumented adult population lived with their U.S.-born children, 
either minors or adults.54  By 2016, that number increased to 36 percent.55
IRCA’s legalization programs have also increased the number of 
mixed status families—families comprised of members with different 
50 D’Vera Cohn, Future immigration will change the face of America by 2065, Pew Re-
search Center (October 5, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/05/future-
immigration-will-change-the-face-of-america-by-2065.
51 Paul Taylor, Mark Hugo-Lopez, Jeffrey S. Passel & Seth Motel, Unauthorized Immi-
grants: Length of Residency, Patterns of Parenthood, Pew Research Center (Dec. 1, 2011) 
(data is derived from figure 2), available at https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2011/12/01/ 
unauthorized-immigrants-length-of-residency-patterns-of-parenthood.
52 Id.
53 Jie Zong et al., Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the 
United States, Migration Pol’y Inst. (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states-8.
54 Jeffrey Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Number of babies born in U.S. to unauthorized immi-
grants declines, Pew Research Center (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/09/11/number-of-babies-born-in-u-s-to-unauthorized-immigrants-declines.
55 Jeffrey Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Number of U.S.-Born Babies with Unauthorized Im-
migrant Parents Has Fallen Since 2007, Pew Research Center (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.
pew research.org/fact-tank/2018/11/01/the-number-of-u-s-born-babies-with-unauthorized- 
immigrant-parents-has-fallen-since-2007.
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immigration statuses.  This status has caused difficulties for children of 
immigrants, both those who are U.S. citizens and those born abroad and 
raised in the United States.56  The number of children born in the United 
States to immigrant parents (as opposed to foreign-born children) has 
increased from 77 percent of the total number of children of immigrants 
in 1990 to 88 percent in 2014.57  Other recent data shows that a small-
er percentage of these U.S.-born children were born to undocumented 
immigrants than in prior years.58  This again supports the finding that 
more established immigrants are having U.S.-born children—one of the 
effects of the 1986 IRCA legalization program.
As I have previously written, the plight of foreign-born children 
who remain noncitizens in the United States represents a particularly 
poignant aspect of long-overdue immigration reform.59  Foreign-born 
children who are brought to the United States without lawful status 
experience the troubling circumstance of being possibly deported to 
a country with which they may have little familiarity.  This phenom-
enon came into sharp focus during the ongoing debate and litigation 
surrounding the Obama Administration’s Deferred Action for Child-
hood Arrivals (DACA) program, which provides deferred action status 
to certain young people in the United States without status and the 
Deferred Action for Parental Accountability (DAPA), which sought to 
provide deferred action status to certain parents of United States citi-
zen and lawful permanent resident children.  DAPA intended to provide 
deferred action status to certain eligible parents, specifically those who 
could establish, among other requirements, a certain period of residency 
in the United States and lack of a criminal history.60  Deferred action 
status does not equate to lawful status or even status that leads to law-
fulness or United States citizenship, but rather deems the beneficiary as 
the least among governmental priorities for deportation and provides 
authorization for lawful employment.
56 Zong, supra note 53 (noting that of the 17.5 million children born to immigrant parents, 
88 percent of them were themselves born in the United States, making them U.S. citizens).
57 Passel & Cohn, supra note 54.
58 Id.  See also Angela M. Banks, Deporting Families: Legal Matter or Political Question, 27 
Ga. St. Univ. L. Rev. 289, 306 (2011) (noting that mixed-status families are often created when 
immigrants with well-established ties to the United States have U.S.-born children).
59 Mariela Olivares, Renewing the Dream: DREAM Act Redux and Immigration Reform, 
16 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 79, 79–90 (2013).
60 Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, https://
www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction#2 (last visited Sept. 2, 2019).
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Several states challenged the DAPA program in federal court. 
The United States Supreme Court declined, however, to decide on the 
constitutionality and viability of the program.61  When Donald Trump 
became president, his administration ultimately rescinded the DAPA 
policy in 2017.62  Similar in some respects to DAPA, DACA provides cer-
tain young people deferred action status if they remain eligible under 
the program’s provisions.  Unlike DAPA, however, DACA was imple-
mented in 2012 and has been administered since then.63  Although the 
Obama Administration introduced an expansion of the eligibility pro-
visions of DACA, which was halted by the 2016 United States Supreme 
Court decision, DACA in its original form still provides ongoing status 
for some beneficiaries although it remains in a precarious position under 
the Trump Administration’s ongoing targeting of immigrants.64
IRCA’s shortfalls (i.e., lack of legalization possibilities for women; 
employment verification failings and overall lack of enforcement) also 
set the foundation for the recent increased migration of family units and 
unaccompanied minors.  Such migration skyrocketed beginning in about 
2014, when undocumented immigrant women with their child(ren) and 
unaccompanied children entered the United States in record numbers. 
As I have previously documented, in fiscal year 2013, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) apprehended 21,553 unaccompanied children 
and 7,265 “family units”—meaning women and their child(ren)—along 
the South Texas border with Mexico.  In 2014, CBP apprehended 49,959 
unaccompanied children and 52,326 family units.65  2015 data shows that 
61 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
62 See Rescission of November 20, 2014 Memorandum Providing for Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), Dep’t of Homeland Securi-
ty (June 15, 2017), available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DAPA%20
Cancellation%20Memo.pdf.
63 Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. Dep’t of Home-
land Sec., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Serv., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/ 
consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last visited Sept. 2, 2019).
64 In September 2017, the Trump Administration announced the end of the DACA pro-
gram, justifying its rescission because the Supreme Court found similar programs for parents of 
DACA recipients unconstitutional.  Michael D. Shear, Trump Has Right to End DACA, Justice. 
Dept. Tells Supreme Court, NY Times (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/us/
politics/daca-trump.html?searchResultPosition=1 (Lawyers from the Department of Justice 
have continuously asserted that President Trump was “fully within his rights” to eliminate the 
DACA program).
65 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Enforcement and Removal Opera-
tions Report (2014), 2–3, available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2014-
ice- immigration-removals.pdf; see also Olivares, Intersectionality at the Intersection, supra note 
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97 percent of the mothers and children detained were from Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico, showing a continued targeting of 
Latina/o/x migrants.66  After Trump’s crackdown on migrants entering at 
the southern U.S. border, apprehensions reached record numbers.  Data 
shows that apprehensions of migrants in the first eight months of fis-
cal year 2019 totaled more than all apprehensions made in fiscal year 
2018.67  Moreover, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) apprehen-
sions and detention of family units increased from approximately 23,000 
in November 2018 to almost 59,000 in May 2019.68  These current trends 
highlight the increased targeting of Latina/o/x people, and, specifically, a 
new focus on immigrant women and families.69
Since 2017, under Trump’s orders, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE)  and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
ramped up the detention and prosecution of migrants who entered the 
United States without documentation, asserting that this Zero Tolerance 
Prosecution Policy was targeting criminals and serving to deter future 
prosecution.70  This policy has caused ICE to jail parents who entered 
without documentation and forcibly remove their children to “family 
residential centers.”  Under this Family Separation Policy, the parallel 
program to the Zero Tolerance Prosecution Policy, credible reports indi-
cate that from January 2017 to Oct 15, 2018, almost 2,800 children—some 
as young as two years old—were stripped from their otherwise fit and 
2, at 974–75 (discussing these numbers and the effects on families); Mariela Olivares, The Rise 
of Zero Tolerance and the Demise of Family, 36 Ga. St. Univ. L. Rev. 287 (2020) (discussing the 
rise in family detention).
66 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children, 
(2015), http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children (pro-
viding data for fiscal year 2014).
67 Stefanie Pousoulides & Miriam Valverde, The facts behind the detention of immi-
grants, Politifact, (July 8, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2019/jul/08/
facts-behind-detention-immigrants.
68 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Southwest Border Migration FY 2019, (Sept. 6, 
2019), available at https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration.
69 A comprehensive study on family detention revealed that historical practice and recent 
Trump Administration actions resulted in the jailing of thousands of women and children in 
detention centers.  As one illustrative example of how family detention targets women and 
children, in August 2014, the ICE Karnes County detention center, which had been construct-
ed to jail only male migrants had to convert to a family detention center, jailing women and 
children.  See Ingrid Eagly et al, Detaining Families: A Study of Asylum Adjudication in Family 
Detention, 106 Cal. L. Rev. 785, 798–800 (2018).
 . Olivares, The Rise of Zero Tolerance and the Demise of Family, supra note 65.
70 See id.
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capable parent or adult guardian.71  The policy ignited a widespread 
outcry of resistance from all ranges of the political spectrum, ultimately 
leading to the formal end of the Family Separation Policy in June 2019.72 
Yet, the Trump Administration’s attack on migrant families—affecting 
mostly Latina women and children—continues through their litiga-
tion efforts against family detention protections and other immigration 
protections.73  Thus, although the trends of Latina/o/x migration differ 
demographically today than in the time of IRCA, the concerted govern-
mental effort to target Latina/o/x migration and oppress immigrants is as 
robust now as it was then.
ConClusIon
As scholars and activists determine how the current subjugation 
of Latina/o/x immigrants will shape short and longterm political and 
social results, the DACA and DAPA programs provide illuminative 
lessons about IRCA’s legacy.  First, the IRCA legalization programs 
were incredibly far-reaching, affording status to approximately 3 mil-
lion undocumented immigrants.  Similarly, it is estimated that there are 
approximately 2 million undocumented young people who would be eli-
gible under DACA.74  As of April 2019, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
71 See U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services Off. of Inspector General, Separated Chil-
dren Placed in Office of Refugee Resettlement Care (2019), (this report details the bungled im-
plementation of the Family Separation Policy from its inception), available at https://oig.hhs.
gov/oei/reports/oei-BL-18-00511.pdf; see also Family Separation by the Numbers, Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-and-deten-
tion/family-separation (last visited Sept. 17, 2019).
72 See Olivares, The Rise of Zero Tolerance and the Demise of Family, supra note 65.
73 On August 21, 2019, the Trump Administration announced plans to terminate the Flores 
Agreement.  The end of the Agreement will allow DHS to detain migrant families indefinitely, 
beyond the current twenty-day limit for holding children.  Katie Reilly & Madeleine Carlisle, 
The Trump Administration’s Move to End Rule Limiting Detention of Migrant Children Reject-
ed in Court, Time (Aug. 21, 2019), https://time.com/5657381/trump-administration-flores-agree-
ment-migrant-children.  Recently, Judge Dolly Gee of the Federal District Court in Los An-
geles blocked the Trump Administration’s plan to expand the time period for which children 
could be detained.  Miriam Jordan, Judge Blocks Trump Administration Plan to Detain Mi-
grant Children, NY Times (Sept. 27, 2019 7:15 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/27/us/
migrant-children-flores-court.html?campaign_id=60&instance_id=0&segment_id=17413&us-
er_id=1dc44f596824b545753ff59d03244cf9&regi_id=97271861ing-news (“Judge Dolly Gee of 
the Federal District Court in Los Angeles, who oversees the 1997 court settlement known as 
the Flores agreement, concluded that the administration’s attempt to frame regulations that 
would carry out the mandate to protect migrant children—but allow them to be detained for 
long periods—was not adequate.”).
74 Zong, supra note 53.
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Services (USCIS) approved approximately 1.582 million DACA appli-
cations.75  Although DACA has a precarious future, the possibility of 
immigration legislation that will eventually benefit young immigrants 
continues to be a possibility—especially as the 2020 presidential 
campaign season creates opportunity for such conversation.  Some Dem-
ocratic party presidential candidates voiced support for policies that, like 
DAPA, would regularize the status of other immigrants, including the 
parents of the DACA population.76  Like IRCA a generation ago, such 
legislation could have widespread effects.  For example, data shows that 
3.61 million undocumented immigrants would have been eligible for the 
DAPA program.77  Although programs like DACA and DAPA do not go 
as far as the legalization programs of IRCA and simply provide deferred 
action status rather than a direct pathway to lawful immigration status 
or United States citizenship, such regularization of status would provide 
stability for millions of people.
Moreover, though the DACA and DAPA programs do not rise to 
same level of the benefits as the IRCA 1986 legalization provisions, the 
DACA and DAPA beneficiaries were directly affected by IRCA, includ-
ing its legalization program, and the lack of subsequent reforms.  Even 
if the more recent arrivals of undocumented immigrant children and 
families from Central America are not as clearly related to direct ben-
eficiaries of IRCA, the trend indicates a continued migratory pull and 
push from Central America.  Further, these recently arrived immigrants 
are family units with children and/or unaccompanied children—all of 
whom, if allowed to stay in the United States, will contribute to the Lati-
na/o/x population.
Importantly, efforts must continue to protect families and vehe-
mently resist the breaking apart and jailing of migrant mothers and 
75 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Number of Form I-821D, Consideration of 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals by Fiscal Year, Quarter, Intake, Biometrics and Case 
Status Fiscal Year 2012–2016 (April 30, 2019), available at https://www.uscis.gov/sites/ default/
files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/
All%20Form%20Types/DACA/DACA_FY19_Q3_APR_FINAL.pdf.
76 Tara Golshan, Elizabeth Warren’s Immigration Proposal Goes Much Further Than a 
Pathway to Citizenship, Vox (July 12, 2019 9:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/7/12/20690200/
elizabeth-warren-immigration-proposal-2020 (“And as millions of undocumented immigrants 
who came to the US as children live in legal limbo as the administration sunsets the De-
ferred Action For Childhood Arrivals program, Warren is calling to expand the program for 
DREAMers and their families, as well as those with Temporary Protected Status.”).
77 Zong, supra note 53.
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children.  Thus, as advocates and policymakers evaluate history to deter-
mine how best to implement immigration reform, it is imperative that 
longterm repercussions be considered.  It is a lesson that immigration 
law and policy is not of the individual but, very often, of the family.  The 
lessons and effects of IRCA teach us that law and policy must include 
pathways to unify and reunite families, regularize the status of longterm 
immigrants already here, and welcome the most vulnerable among them.
